Battle of Borodino

Battle of Borodino
Part of French invasion of Russia (1812)
"Battle of Moscow, 7th September 1812", 1822 by Louis Lejeune
Date September 7, 1812 Location Borodino, Russia Result French victory; Strategic withdrawal of Russian Army;[1] French strategic Loss[2]
Belligerents
French Empire Duchy of Warsaw	Russian Empire[3]
Commanders and leaders
Napoleon I Józef Antoni Poniatowski	Mikhail Kutuzov Pyotr Bagration  † Michael Andreas Barclay de Tolly
Strength
130,000 men, 587 guns[4]	120,000 men, 624 guns
Casualties and losses
~30,000–35,000 dead, wounded and captured[5] [6](inc. 47 generals, 480 officers)	39,000–45,000 dead, wounded and captured[7][8] (inc. 23 generals, 211 officers)

The Battle of Borodino (Russian: Бородинская битва, Borodinskaya bitva; French: Bataille de la Moskowa), fought on September 7, 1812,^[9] was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the French invasion of Russia, involving more than 250,000 troops and resulting in at least 70,000 casualties. The French Grande Armée under Emperor Napoleon I attacked the Imperial Russian Army of General Mikhail Kutuzov near the village of Borodino, west of the town of Mozhaysk, and eventually captured the main positions on the battlefield, but failed to destroy the Russian army. About a third of Napoleon's soldiers were killed or wounded; Russian losses, while heavier, could be replaced due to Russia's large population, since Napoleon's campaign took place on Russian soil.

The battle itself ended with the disorganized Russian Army out of position and ripe for complete defeat. The state of exhaustion of the French forces and the lack of recognition of the state of the Russian Army led Napoleon to remain on the battlefield with his army instead of the forced pursuit that had marked other campaigns that he had conducted in the past.^[10] The entirety of the Guard however was available to Napoleon and in refusing to use it lost his singular chance at the destruction of the Russian army: he did not get another.^[11] The battle at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign, as it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia. By withdrawing, the Russian army preserved its combat strength, eventually allowing them to force Napoleon out of the country.

Background

Napoleon's invasion of Russia

The French Grande Armée had begun its invasion of Russia in June 1812; Emperor Alexander I proclaimed a Patriotic War in response. The Russian forces, initially massed along the Polish frontier, fell back in the face of the swift French advance. Count Michael Barclay de Tolly, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, attempted to form a defensive line, but his efforts were thwarted by the fast-moving French.

Napoleon I on the Borodino Heights, by Vasily Vereshchagin (1897)

Napoleon advanced from Vitebsk, hoping to catch the Russian Army in the open where he could annihilate it.^[12] The French army, however, was not positioned well for an extended overland campaign, as it was 925 km (575 miles) from its nearest logistic base at Kovno (Kaunas); the extended French supply lines were vulnerable to assault, causing Napoleon's forces to be seriously depleted by Russian supply raids.^[13] The central French force, under Napoleon's direct command, had crossed the Niemen with 286,000 men; however, by the time of the battle, it numbered 161,475 (most had died of starvation and disease).^[14] Nonetheless, the lure of a decisive battle spurred Napoleon to action, driving him further into Russia and further stretching his supply lines.

Meanwhile, political infighting between Barclay's subordinates repeatedly prevented the Russian commander from committing his forces to battle.^[15] Barclay's constant retreat was perceived by both his fellow generals and the Russian court as a reluctance to fight; consequently, he was removed from command and replaced by Prince Mikhail Kutuzov on August 29, 1812.^[16] The 67-year old General Kutuzov was not seen by his contemporaries as the equal of Napoleon; however, he was favoured over Barclay because he was ethnically Russian (unlike Barclay, who was of Scottish descent), because he possessed the ability to muster a good defense,^[17] and because he inspired the complete loyalty of both his army and his subordinates.^[18]

The new Russian commander, however, was also unable to establish a defensive position until within 125 kilometers of Moscow; Kutuzov ordered another retreat to Gshatsk on August 30, at which time the ratio of French to Russian forces had shrunk from 3:1 to 5:4.^[19] Kutuzov established his defensive line in an eminently defensible area near the village of Borodino, the best defensive position until the Russians reached Moscow.^[20] Starting on September 3, Kutuzov strengthened the line with earthworks, including the Raevski Redoubt in the center-right of the line and three open, arrow-shaped "Bagration flèches" (named after Pyotr Bagration) on the left.

The Battle of Shevardino Redoubt

The initial Russian disposition, which stretched south of the new Smolensk Highway (Napoleon's expected route of advance), was anchored on its left by a pentagonal earthwork redoubt erected on a mound near the village of Shevardino. In an effort to flank the Russian defensive line, the French advanced from the west and south of the village, creating a brief but bloody prelude to the main battle.^[21]

General Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov at Borodino

The struggle opened on September 5 when Prince Joachim Murat's French forces met Konovnitzyn's Russians in a massive cavalry clash; the Russians eventually retreated to the Kolorzkoi Cloister when their flank was threatened. Fighting reopened the next day, but Konovyitzyn again retreated when Prince Eugène de Beauharnais' Fourth Corps arrived, threatening his flank. The Russians retreated to the Shevardino Redoubt, where a pitched battle occurred. Murat led Nansouty's First Cavalry Corps and Montbrun's Second Cavalry Corps, supported by Compan's Division of Louis Nicholas Davout's First Infantry Corps against the redoubt; simultaneously, Prince Josef Poniatowski's infantry attacked the position from the south. The French captured the redoubt, at the cost of 4,000 French and 7,000 Russian casualties.^[22]

The unexpected French advance from the west and the fall of the Shevardino redoubt threw the Russian formation into disarray. Since the left flank of their defensive position had collapsed, Russian forces withdrew to the east, constructing a makeshift position centered around the village of Utitza. The left flank of the Russian position was, therefore, hanging in the air and ripe for a flanking attack.

Opposing forces

Battle of Borodino, by Peter von Hess, 1843

Russian forces present at the battle included 180 infantry battalions, 164 cavalry squadrons, 20 Cossack regiments, and 55 artillery batteries (637 artillery pieces). In total, the Russians fielded 155,200 troops.^[23] There were 10,000 Cossacks as well as 33,000 Russian militiamen in the area who did not participate in the battle. After the battle, the militia units were broken up in order to provide reinforcements to depleted regular infantry battalions. Of the 637 Russian artillery pieces, 300 were held in reserve; many of these reserve pieces were never committed to the battle.^[24]

French forces included 214 battalions of infantry, 317 squadrons of cavalry and 587 artillery pieces totaling of 128,000 troops.^[25] However, the French Imperial Guard, which consisted of 30 infantry battalions, 27 cavalry squadrons and 109 artillery pieces — a total of 18,500 troops — was never committed to action.^[26]

Estimates by historians

^[27]

Battle of Borodino

The position

Map of the battle

The Russian position at Borodino consisted of a series of disconnected earthworks running in an arc from the Moskva River on the right, along its tributary, the Kolocha (whose steep banks added to the defense), and towards the village of Utitza on the left.^[28] Thick woods interspersed along the Russian left and center (on the French side of the Kolocha) made the deployment and control of French forces difficult, aiding the defenders. The Russian center was defended by the Raevsky Redoubt, a massive open-backed earthwork mounting 19 12-pounder cannon which had a clear field of fire all the way to the banks of the Kolocha stream.

Kutuzov, who was expecting a corps-sized force of reinforcements on his right, planned to cross the Kolocha north of Borodino, attack the French left, and roll it up. This helped explain why the more powerful 1st Army under Barclay was placed in already strong positions on the right, which were virtually unassailable by the French. The 2nd Army, under Bagration, was expected to hold on the left; however the fall of Shevardino unanchored the Russian left flank. Despite the repeated pleas of his generals to redeploy their forces, Kutuzov did nothing to change these initial dispositions. Thus, when the action began and became a defensive rather than an offensive battle for the Russians, their heavy preponderance in artillery was wasted on a right wing that would never be attacked, while the French artillery did much to help win the battle.^[28]

Bagration's flèches

Nansouty's heavy cavalry attack squares of Russian guards-men to the left of Semyanovskaya (foreground) to support Ney's attack. Detail from the Borodino Panorama by Franz Rubo, 1912.

Napoleon, in command of the French forces, made errors similar to those of his Russian adversary, deploying his forces inefficiently and failing to exploit the weaknesses in the Russian line. Despite Marshal Davout's suggestion of a maneuver to outflank the weak Russian left, the Emperor instead ordered Davout's First Corps to move directly forward into the teeth of the defense, while the flanking maneuver was left to the weak Fifth Corps of Prince Poniatowski.^[29] The initial French attack was aimed at seizing the three Russian positions collectively known as the Bagration flèches, four arrow-head shaped, open-backed earthworks which arced out to the left en échelon in front of the Kolocha stream. These positions helped support the Russian left, which had no terrain advantages. The flèches were supported by artillery from the village of Semyanovskaya, whose elevation dominated the other side of the Kolocha.^[28] The battle began at 0600 with the opening of the 102-gun French grand battery against the Russian center.^[30] Davout sent Compan's Division against the southernmost of the flèches, with Desaix's Division echeloned out to the left.^[22] When Compans exited the woods on the far bank of the Kolocha, he was hit by massed Russian cannon fire; both Compans and Desaix were wounded, but the French continued their assault.^[31]

Davout, seeing the confusion, personally led his 57th Brigade forward until he had his horse shot from under him; he fell so hard that General Sorbier reported him as dead. General Rapp arrived to replace him, only to find Davout alive and leading the 57th forward again. Rapp then led the 61st Brigade forward when he was wounded (for the 22nd time in his career). By 07:30, Davout had gained control of the three flèches. Prince Bagration quickly led a counterattack that threw the French out of the positions, only to have Marshal Michel Ney lead a charge by the 24th Regiment that retook them.^[31] Although not enamoured of Barclay, Bagration turned to him for aid, ignoring Kutuzov altogether; Barclay, to his credit, responded quickly, sending three guard regiments, eight grenadier battalions, and twenty-four 12-pounder cannon at their best pace to bolster Semyenovskaya.^[32]

Ney's infantry push Russian grenadiers back from the flèches (which can be seen from the rear in the background). Detail from the Borodino Panorama.

During the confused fighting, French and Russian units moved forward into impenetrable smoke and were smashed by artillery and musketry fire that was horrendous even by Napoleonic standards. Infantry and cavalrymen had difficulty maneuvering over the heaps of corpses and masses of wounded. Prince Murat advanced with his cavalry around the flèches to attack Bagration's infantry, but was confronted by Duka's 2nd Cuirassier Division supported by Neverovsky's infantry. This counterpunch drove Murat to seek the cover of allied Württemberger Infantry. Barclay's reinforcements, however, were sent into the fray only to be torn to pieces by French artillery, leaving Friant's Division in control of the Russian forward position at 11:30. Dust, smoke, confusion, and exhaustion all combined to keep the French commanders on the field (Davout, Ney, and Murat) from comprehending that all the Russians before them had fallen back, were in confusion, and ripe for the taking. Napoleon, who had been sick with a cold and was too far from the action to really observe what was going on, refused to send his subordinates reinforcements; he was hesitant to release his last reserve, the Imperial Guard, so far from France.^[33]

Struggle for the Raevsky redoubt

Saxon cuirassiers and Polish lancers of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry corps clash with Russian cuirassiers. The rise of Raevsky redoubt is on right, the steeple of Borodino church in the background. Detail from the Borodino Panorama.

Prince Eugène de Beauharnais advanced his corps against Borodino, rushing the village and capturing it from the Russian Guard Jäger. However, the advancing columns rapidly lost their cohesion; shortly after clearing Borodino, they faced fresh Russian assault columns and retreated back to the village. General Delzons was posted to Borodino to prevent the Russians retaking it.^[34] Morand's division then crossed to the north side of the Semyenovka Stream, while the remainder of Eugene's forces crossed three bridges across the Kalocha to the south, placing them on the same side of the stream as the Russians. He then deployed most of his artillery and began to push the Russians back toward the Raevsky redoubt. Broussier and Morand's divisions then advanced together with furious artillery support. The redoubt changed hands as Barclay was forced to personally rally Paskevitch's routed regiment.^[35] Kutuzov then ordered Yermolov to take action; the general brought forward three horse artillery batteries that began to blast the open-ended redoubt, while the 3rd Battalion of the Ufa Regiment and two Jäger regiments brought up by Barclay rushed in with the bayonet to eliminate Bonami's Brigade.^[36] The Russian reinforcements' assault returned the redoubt to Russian control.

French and Russian cavalry clash behind the Raevsky redoubt. Details from Roubaud's panoramic painting.

Eugene's artillery continued to pound Russian support columns, while Marshals Ney and Davout set up a crossfire with artillery on the Semenovskoya heights.^[37] Barclay countered by moving the Russian General Eugene over to the right to support Miloradovitch in his defense of the redoubt.^[38] When Barclay brought up troops against an attacking French brigade, he described it as "A walk into Hell".^[37] During the height of the battle, Kutuzov's subordinates were making all of the decisions for him; according to Colonel Karl von Clausewitz of On War fame, the Russian commander "seemed to be in a trance."^[38] With the death of General Kutaisov, Chief of Artillery, most of the Russian cannon sat useless on the heights to the rear and were never ordered into battle, while the French artillery wreaked havoc on the Russians.^[39]

French cuirassiers charge into the Raevsky redoubt.

At 14:00, Napoleon renewed the assault against the redoubt, as Broussier's, Morand's, and Gerard's divisions launched a massive frontal attack, with Chastel's light cavalry division on their left and the II Reserve Cavalry Corps on their right;^[38] General Caulaincourt ordered Wathier's cuirassier division to lead the assault. Barclay watched Eugene's assault preparations and countered it, moving his forces against it. The French artillery, however, began bombarding the assembling force even as it gathered. Caulaincourt led the attack of Wathier's cuirassiers into the opening at the back of the redoubt and met his death as the charge was stopped cold by Russian musketry.^[40] General Thielemann then led eight Saxon and two Polish cavalry squadrons against the back of the redoubt, while officers and sergeants of his command actually forced their horses through the redoubt's embrasures, sowing confusion and allowing the French cavalry and infantry to take the position. The battle had all but ended, with both sides so exhausted that only the artillery was still at work.^[41] Napoleon once again refused to release the Guard; the battle concluded at approximately 16:00.^[42]

Utiza

The 3rd area of operations was around the village of Utiza. Poniatowski and the Polish contingent contested for the village of Utiza effecting its capture with his 1st attempt. General Tutshkov had ejected the French forces by 08:00. Gen. Junot led the Westphalian's to join the attack and again captured Utiza. The heavy under-growth greatly hindered Ponitowski's efforts but eventually Tutshkov was battling to avoid being cut off from the rest of the Russian forces.^[43] General Barclay sent help in the form of Baggehuffwudt (known as Bagavout in English literature) to the rescue along with Konovnitzyn in support.^[43]

End of the battle

According to historian Riehn: Napoleon went forward to see the situation from the former Russian front lines shortly after the redoubts had been taken. The Russians had moved to the next ridge-line in much disarray, however that disarray was not seen from that distance with the dust and haze raised by an army on the move. All he could see were masses of troops in the distance and thus nothing more was attempted. Neither the attack, which relied on brute force, nor the refusal to use the Guard to finish the day's work showed any brilliance on Napoleon's part.^[44] Only the misplacement of Russian forces by Kutuzov over both Bagration's and Barclay's protest prevented the ruin of the French army that day. Barclay communicated with Kutuzov in order to receive further instructions. According to Wolzogen (in an account dripping with sarcasm), the commander was found a half-hour away on the road to Moscow, encamped with an entourage of young nobles and grandly pronouncing he would drive Napoleon off the next day.^[45] Despite his bluster, Kutuzov knew from dispatches that his army had been too badly hurt to fight a continuing action the following day. He knew exactly what he was doing: by fighting the pitched battle, he could now retreat with the Russian army still intact, lead its recovery, and force the weakened French forces to move even further from their bases of supply. The dénouement became a textbook example of what a hold logistics placed upon an army far from its center of supply.^[46] On September 8, the Russian army moved away from the battlefield in twin columns to Semolino, allowing Napoleon to occupy Moscow and await a Russian surrender that would never come.^[18]

Noted author and historian Chandler however gives us a view that differed in more than a few ways: Chandler notes that General Kutuzov remained in control of the battle throughout ordering counter-moves to Napoleon's tactics rather than Bagration and Barclay laying down differences and cooperating to overcome the deposition mistakes of the Russian Army. Neither is the tent scene played out and instead has Kutuzov remaining with the army. Chandler also has the Russian army in much better shape moving to secondary prepared positions and seriously considering attacking the next day.^[47]

Casualties

With both sides evenly matched and Napoleon unimaginatively content to launch his troops straight into the teeth of prepared positions, the battle was destined to be a costly and exhausting stalemate.

The casualties of the battle were staggering: according to French General Staff Inspector P. Denniee, the Grand Army lost approximately 28,000 soldiers: 6,562 (including 269 officers) were reported as dead, 21,450 as wounded.^[48] But according to French historian Aristid Martinien,^[49] at least 460 French officers (known by name) were killed in battle. In total, the Grand Army lost 1,928 officers dead and wounded, including 49 generals.^[49] It should be noted that the casualties were for a single day of battle while the Russian figures are for the 5th and the 7th, combined. Using the same accounting method for both armies brings the actual French Army count to 34,000-35,000.^[50]

Some 52,000 Russian troops were reported as dead, wounded or missing, including 1,000 prisoners, some 8,000 men were separated from their units and returned over the next few days bringing the total Russian losses to 44,000.^[51] Twenty-two Russian generals were killed or wounded, including Prince Bagration, who died of his wounds on September 24.^[8] Suffering a wound on the Borodino battlefield was effectively a death sentence, as French forces did not possess enough food for the healthy, much less the sick; consequently, equal numbers of wounded soldiers starved to death, died of their injuries, or perished through neglect.^[52]

Taken as a one day battle in the scope of the Napoleonic conflict this was the bloodiest battle of this series of conflicts. Taken as a single day battle the combined casualties range to 64,000~65,000. The next nearest battle would be Waterloo at about 55,000 for the day.^[53]

In the historiography of this battle it will be noted that the figures would be deliberately inflated or underplayed by the generals of both sides attempting to lessen the impact the figures would have on public opinion both during aftermath of the battle or for political reasons later during the soviet period.^[54]

Aftermath and legacy

While Napoleon won the battle of Borodino, some scholars and contemporaries described Borodino as a Pyrrhic victory.^[55] This victory ultimately cost him his army, as it allowed the French emperor to believe that the campaign was winnable, exhausting his forces as he pressed still further into Russia in his attempts to defeat the Russian army. French historian Rhiem notes that the Borodino victory allowed Napoleon to move on to Moscow, where — even allowing for the arrival of reinforcements - the French Army could only possess a maximum of 95,000 men, who would be ill equipped to win a battle due to a lack of supplies and ammunition. The Grande Armée suffered 66% of its casualties by the time of the Moscow retreat; snow, starvation, and typhus ensured that only 23,000 men crossed the Russian border alive. Furthermore, while the Russian army suffered heavy casualties in the battle, they had fully recovered by the time of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow; consequently, they immediately began to interfere with the French withdrawal, costing Napoleon much of his surviving army. Napoleon's own account of the battle gives a good understanding of it: "Of the fifty battles I have fought, the most terrible was that before Moscow. The French showed themselves to be worthy victors, and the Russians can rightly call themselves invincible."^[56]

Legacy

1987 Soviet commemorative coin, reverse

Poet Mikhail Lermontov romanticised the battle in his poem Borodino. The battle was famously described by Count Leo Tolstoy in his novel War and Peace as "a continuous slaughter which could be of no avail either to the French or the Russians". A huge panorama representing the battle was painted by Franz Roubaud for the centenary of Borodino and installed on the Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow to mark the 150th anniversary of the event. Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky also composed his 1812 Overture to commemorate the battle.

In Russia, the Battle of Borodino is reenacted yearly on August 26. On the battlefield itself, the Bagration flèches are still preserved; a modest monument has been constructed in honor of the French soldiers who fell in the battle. There are also remnants of trenches from the seven-day battle fought at the same battlefield in 1941 between the Soviet and German forces (which took fewer human lives than the one of 1812).

A commemorative 1-ruble coin was released in the Soviet Union in 1987 to commemorate the 175th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, and four million of them were minted.^[57] A minor planet 3544 Borodino, discovered by Soviet astronomer Nikolai Stepanovich Chernykh in 1977 was named after the village Borodino.^[58]

Historiography

It is not unusual for a pivotal battle in this time range to have a tortured history in attempting to document it and bring it forth to the public. The Battle of Waterloo is an outstanding example as is the entirety of the American War of 1812. Few events have suffered a more tortured history than that of the Battle of Borodino.^[59] Both the politics of the time and stresses in the Russian command changes which very high due to acute ethnic tensions between Russian nobility and 2nd and 3rd generations Russians of German descent conspired to lead to self-magnified participation or exaggerations of non-participation.^[60] So not only does a historian have to deal with the normal problem of a veteran looking back over years or decades and recall events as he or she would have liked them to have been, but in some cases there was outright malice involved. Nor was this strictly a Russian event, as bickering and sabotage was not in the least unknown to the French Marshals and their reporting Generals. To lie like a bulletin was not just a French affair either, with Kutuzov in particular doing an early form of misinformation that has propagated to this day.^[59] Further distortions occurred during the Soviet years when an adherence to a "Formula" was the expectation during the Stalin years and for some time after that.^[59] The over-reliance of western histories on French sources has been noted as well.

Footnotes

References

• Chandler, David G. Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars London: Wordsworth editions Ltd., 1999.
• Chandler, David G. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. ISBN 978-0-02-523660-8
• Duffy, Christopher, Borodino and the War of 1812. London: Cassell & Company, 1972.
• Hourtoulle, F.G. Borodino/The Moskova: The Battle for the Redoubts. Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2000.
• Mikaberidze, Alexander. The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov. London: Pen & Sword, 2007.
• Markham, David. Napoleon for Dummies New York: Wiley Pub Inc., 2005).
• Nafziger, George F. Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1988.
• Riehn, Richard K. Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
• Smith, D(?), The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book. London: Greenhill Books, 1998.
• Troitsky, N.A. Фельдмаршал Кутузов: Мифы и Факты, Центрполиграф (Field Marshal Kutuzov: Myths and Facts), (publisher unknown) 2002.
• "История военного искусства" (History of Military Art), М. Воениздат, 1966. - Russian source (publisher and translation of author's name?)

External links

• First-hand account of the battle by Louis-François, Baron Lejeune a French aide-de-camp
• A very detailed description of the battle
• Borodino: maps, diagrams, illustrations
• The Virtual Battle of Borodino
• The Battle of Borodino, situation at 12.30 p.m. Visual tour of Borodino Panorama by Franz A. Roubaud
• The battle of Borodino reconstruction. 195 Anniversary Photos